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Abstract 
We extend the scarce evidence on the labor supply in post-transition countries by esti-
mating the wage elasticity of labor force participation in the Czech Republic. Using 
household income survey data, we find that a one-percent rise in the gross wage in-
creases the probability of working by 0.16 and 0.02 percentage points for women and 
men, respectively. Taking into account the tax and benefit system, these semi-elasticities 
fall to 0.06 for women and 0.01 for men. We interpret the difference between the esti-
mates from the two specifications as a summary measure of the welfare system dis-
incentives. The estimated wage elasticities lie at the lower end of the range of values 
reported for mature market economies. This finding is consistent with the stylized fact 
that the labor supply in countries with high labor force participation rates, such as 
the Czech Republic, tends to be less sensitive to wages.  
1. Introduction 
Labor markets in post-Communist countries resemble those in mature market 
economies. Returns to human capital, gender discrimination, unemployment dura-
tion, matching functions, and wage curves have been estimated for markets in transi-
tion
1 and have been found to be comparable to those documented for standard market 
economies. However, evidence on labor supply behavior during and after transition is 
scarce
2 and a comparison with standard findings from market economies is lacking.  
This paper investigates labor supply behavior in the Czech Republic in 2002 
13 years after the change of political regime. Using household income survey data, we 
estimate the wage elasticity of labor force participation using two different definitions  
of wage: the gross wage, ignoring the tax and benefit system, and the effective net 
wage, which takes into account taxes paid and benefits received. A comparison of 
* We thank Štěpán Jurajda for detailed comments and an anonymous referee, Vladimír Bezděk, Kamil
Dybczak, Kamil Galuščák, Tomáš Holub, Jaromír Kalmus, Zdenko Krajčír, Jan Pavel, Ondřej Schnei-
der, Milan Sojka, and the audience at the 4th conference of the Czech Economics Society and the 2008
European Economic Association meeting for helpful suggestions. Part of this work was supported by 
Czech National Bank Research Project No. D1/2005. The views presented in this paper are the authors’,
and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB or the CNB. CERGE-EI is a joint workplace of the Cen-
ter for Economic Research and Graduate Education, Charles University, and the Economics Institute of
the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. 
1  See, for example, Orazem and Vodopivec (1997), Münich, Svejnar, and Terrell (2005b), and Münich,
Svejnar, and Terrell (2005a) on returns to human capital; Hunt (2002), Jolliffe (2002), Adamchik and Bedi
(2003), Jurajda (2003), Jurajda (2005), and Jurajda and Harmgart (2007) on gender discrimination; Ham,
Svejnar, and Terrell (1998) and Ham, Svejnar, and Terrell (1999) on unemployment duration; Münich and 
Svejnar (2007) on unemployment ﬂows and the Beveridge curve; Galuščák and Münich (2005) on the wage
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the two specifications illustrates the impact of taxes and benefits on the labor supply 
decision. We interpret the difference between the two estimates of the wage elasticity 
of labor force participation as an indicator of welfare system disincentives. We con-
sider this behavior-based measure, which reﬂects the actual distortionary effect of gov-
ernment policies on labor supply, to be a more accurate tool for policy evaluation 
than the (ex ante) make-work-pay indicators reported by international organizations.
3  
We find that a one-percent rise in the gross wage increases the probability of 
working by 0.16 and 0.02 percentage point for women and men, respectively. When 
we substitute the gross wage with the effective net wage, these semi-elasticities
4 fall 
to 0.06 for women and 0.01 for men. Under both specifications and for both genders, 
the wage sensitivity of labor force participation decreases with earnings. The gross 
wage elasticity in the top wage quintile is lower, by 47 percent for women and by 
85 percent for men, than the elasticity in the bottom wage quintile; the corresponding 
differences for the net effective wage are similar: 83 percent for men and 41 percent 
for women.  
Our estimates of the wage semi-elasticities of labor force participation are at 
the lower end of the range of values documented for mature market economies. 
The small size of the estimates is consistent with the recent empirical evidence (see 
Blau and Kahn, 2007, and Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis, 2011) that the labor 
supply in countries with high labor force participation rates, such as the 81.6 percent 
for women and 94.8 percent for men in the Czech Republic in 2005, tends to be less 
sensitive to wages. We therefore expect a limited response of the labor supply to 
wages also in other post-transition countries, which have retained high labor force 
participation rates since the Communist period.
5  
The estimated effects of other determinants of labor force participation, such 
as marital status or presence of children, are also in line with the results documented 
in the standard literature. While other income (defined as the sum of the non-labor 
income of the individual and other household income, after tax and excluding social 
benefits), other economic activity in the household (defined as the presence of eco-
nomically active members other than the analyzed individual and her spouse), and 
disability reduce the  labor force participation of both genders, being married and 
having young children has an adverse effect only on women’s decision to work.  
2 We found only two papers that estimate the wage elasticity of the labor supply in transition countries –
Chase (1995) in the Czech and Slovak Republics and Saget (1999) in Hungary. They focus on the early stage 
of transition and find rather unexpected values (compared to the estimates for mature market economies in 
the 1990s). While Saget (1999) documents a rather high (1.81) wage elasticity of labor force participation of
Hungarian married women, Chase (1995) estimates an extremely low (zero) elasticity of labor force partici-
pation of Czech married women. Blau and Kahn (2007) report that the corresponding values for the US in 
1990 lie between 0.41 and 0.44. We discuss the two papers in more detail in the next section. 
3 The average and marginal effective tax rates, net replacement ratios, and welfare traps are the most 
popular among the make-work-pay indicators. See, for example, OECD (2004). 
4 While wage elasticity is defined as the percentage change in the probability of supplying work in re-
sponse to a one-percent rise in wages, wage semi-elasticity describes the absolute change (in percentage 
points) of the probability of supplying work in response to a one-percent rise in wages. 
5 In many Communist countries, labor force participation was obligatory and encouraged both ideologic-
ally and by arrangements such as free provision of child care. Although gradual withdrawal from the labor 
market occurred during the transition from planned to market economies, the labor force participation rates 
in many European post-Communist countries remain high when compared to mature market economies
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the stylized 
facts about labor supply in mature market and transition economies. We then present 
the theoretical framework for the labor supply decision, our econometric model of 
labor force participation, and a brief description of our data. Our main results, their 
interpretation, and policy implications are summarized next, followed by the con-
clusion. 
2. Labor Supply in Mature Market and Transition Economies 
The vast empirical research on labor supply in mature market economies
6 has 
produced many estimates of wage elasticity that span relatively broad intervals. 
The values typically range from 0 to 0.12 for men and from 0.05 to 2 for women 
(see, for example, tables 1 and 2 in Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Female labor sup-
ply – especially of married women and women with children – is almost always found 
to be more wage sensitive than that of men. While most of these estimates are based 
on a full labor supply model of supply of hours of work, some studies, such as ours, 
focus only on labor force participation, a  binary decision whether to work. Most 
papers estimate wage elasticity with gross wages, but there is also extensive literature 
which takes tax and benefit systems into account.
7,8   
Among the estimates for mature market economies, the most comparable, in 
terms of method, time period, and focus, with our gross wage specification are in Blau 
and Kahn (2007). They find that the wage semi-elasticity of labor force participation 
of married women in the US fell from roughly 0.43 to 0.29 between 1990 and 2000.
9  
In contrast with the  substantial labor supply literature in mature market 
economies, research on labor supply behavior in countries after the transition from 
planned to market economies is scarce. To our knowledge, there are only two papers 
which directly estimate the wage elasticity of labor supply in transition countries: 
Saget (1999) (for Hungary) and Chase (1995) (for the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics).
10 Similar to this work, the two studies focus on labor force participation rather 
than the  supply of hours worked. Their estimates come from the  early phases of 
transition and their scope is limited to the labor supply behavior of married women. 
Both papers specify labor force participation as a  function of the  gross wage, 
ignoring income taxes and social benefits.  
6 Killingsworth (1983) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) provide comprehensive surveys of models,
methods, and findings. 
7 See, for example, the Special Issue on Taxation and Labor Supply in Industrial Countries of the Journal 
of Human Resources, 25(3), Summer 1990. A comprehensive overview of the literature that estimates 
the effect of taxes and benefits on labor supply can be also found in Hausman (1985) and Moffitt (2002). 
8 Recent literature estimates the wage sensitivity of labor supply using natural experiments such as changes
in labor market policies. Although these methods are almost certainly superior to simple estimation based on
cross-sectional variation, neither panel data nor natural experiments isolated from the rest of the changes are 
available in the Czech Republic or other transition countries. 
9 The wage semi-elasticities reported in Blau and Kahn (2007), table 6, range across the four alternative 
specifications they estimate between 0.41 and 0.44 in 1990 and between 0.27 and 0.30 in 2000. 
10 Bonin and Euwals (2005) also explore the labor force participation of married women in East and West
Germany during the 1990s, after the German reunification, and use earnings as one of its determinants.
However, they do not focus on wage elasticity and only mention the significant and positive relationship 
they find between participation and wages (without presenting the marginal effects or calculating the elas-
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Figure 1  The Unemployment Rate in the Czech Republic (Percent) 
                    
Source: Aggregate unemployment rate of total population aged 15 years and above. Czech Statistical Office, 
seasonally adjusted. 
 
Saget  (1999)  estimates  a labor  force  participation  model  with  a relatively 
small sample of 720 prime-aged (24 to 54 years old) married women using data from 
1992. Women on maternity leave and unemployed women are excluded from the sam-
ple, which prevents direct comparison with the existing literature, which typically 
leaves these two groups in the sample. Based on her estimation, Saget finds the wage 
elasticity of labor force participation of Hungarian married women in 1992 to be 
1.81,
11 a value which is much higher than, for example, the roughly 0.75 implied by 
the estimates of Blau and Kahn (2007) for the US in 1990.
12   
Chase (1995) compares the labor force participation of Czech and Slovak mar-
ried women (between 20 and 69 years of age) before (in 1984) and after (in 1993) 
the change of political regime and the division of Czechoslovakia. In the specifica-
tion  that  uses  only  the predicted  own  and  husband’s  earnings  in  the labor  force 
participation  equation,  which  is  the most  comparable  to  our  analysis  here,  Chase 
finds that the wage semi-elasticity of labor force participation changed from 0.54 to 
zero




11 The value of 1.81 seems also hard to reconcile with another representation of Saget’s findings that “a one
forint increase in the predicted wage [of a representative woman who earns 80 Ft per hour, i.e., a 1.25 per-
cent increase in wages] […] is estimated to increase the probability of her working by 3.6 per cent,” p. 589 
(which at the average participation rate of 75 percent corresponds to an elasticity of 3.8). The marginal 
effect corresponding to 1.81 elasticity and a 75 percent participation rate on the other hand is 1.36. 
12 Blau and Kahn (2007) estimate that the wage semi-elasticity of participation is roughly 0.43, which,
combined with a participation rate of 57.5 percent, implies an elasticity of 0.75 = 0.43/0.575. 
13 The estimated value (which is actually negative, −0.13) is insignificant at the 10 percent level. Similar to 
Saget (1999), however, standard errors do not seem to be corrected for the presence of predicted variables 
in the second-stage probit estimation. 
14 The only exception to the wage inelastic labor supply behavior of Czech married women in 1993 that
Chase finds when he repeats his estimation for samples stratified by age is the wage elasticity of over 
50 year olds, which is positive, significant, and relatively large (0.7). Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4                                     331 
In 1993, four years after the change of political regime, both the Czech and 
Slovak Republics were still undergoing reforms and structural changes as a part of 
the transition process from planned to market economies. At that time, the phenom-
enon of unemployment had not yet emerged in the Czech Republic as a noticeable 
labor market problem (the unemployment rate was only 4.3 percent in 1993). Com-
pared to other transition economies, the Czech Republic had one of the lowest unem-
ployment rates during the first phase of its transition. However, in the second half of 
the 1990s, when the country entered its first recession, which induced further re-
structuralization, unemployment rose from 4 percent in 1996 to almost 9 percent in 
2000, as illustrated in Figure 1.
15 We therefore expect the labor supply behavior and 
the values of the wage elasticity of labor force participation in the Czech Republic in 
the  new steady-state path of the  post-transition period to differ substantially from 
those during the turbulent years of the early phases of transition, as documented in 
Chase (1995).   
3. Model of Labor Supply Decision 
The theoretical framework of our analysis is the standard static model of labor 
supply.
16 An individual maximizes her utility  
max ( )
{c, h} uc , h  
subject to    () 0 cw h T w h , y , X y , hH = ++ ≤ ≤  
where u is a utility function which depends positively on consumption c and nega-
tively on the number of hours h of work.  
The individual consumes the sum of her total earnings w × h, her non-labor 
income and other household income y (pre-tax and without social transfers), and 
the transfers she gets minus the taxes she pays, as determined by function T(·). 
The parametrization of T is given by the tax and benefit system, where the amount of 
taxes and transfers depends on the level of various types of individual and household 
income, as well as on the demographic characteristics (X) of the household. Working 
hours are restricted to range from zero to a  maximum amount H, so that H-h is 
the number of hours of leisure.  
The maximization problem can be solved in two stages: first, the choice of 
the optimal number of hours conditional on working, and second, the optimal deci-
sion whether to work. The  solution to the  first stage is given by the  first order 
condition in which the optimal number of hours of work h
* (subject to 0 < h ≤ H) 
solves the equation 















15 See, for example, Svejnar (2002) for the development of the Czech labor market in the context of other 
transition countries. 
16 The notation is based on a modified version of the model in Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner (2004), extended
to capture the household structure and to include the individual’s non-labor and other household income. 
Fixed costs of working are omitted as they are not fundamental to the basic idea of the model. The ﬂexible 
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where 






 is the effective marginal tax rate of working an additional 
hour, which includes both the direct marginal tax rate and the reduction in benefits 
due to the increased earnings. The solution to the second stage is determined by com-
paring the utility of working and that of not working. An individual will work if 
the former exceeds the latter:  
                                                   0 () ( 0 )
** uh, c u , c ≥  
Optimal consumption if the individual does not work (c0) equals the benefits 
she receives if not working plus her non-labor and other household income: 
                                                   0 (0 ) cT , y , Xy = +   
Optimal consumption if working is the individual’s total labor, non-labor, and 
other household income plus net transfers (benefits received minus taxes paid). It 
may be expressed as  
                               0 () ( 1 )
** * * cw h T w h , y , Xy c w h τ = + += +−  
where                             
(0 ) ( )
*
*





is the effective marginal tax rate of transition from not working to working.  
The optimal number of hours of work h
** is therefore given by  
                                        h
** = h
*   if:  u(h
*,c
*) ≥ u(0, c0) 
                                        h
** = 0   otherwise 
h
**, which is a function of all the parameters of the model, fully describes the in-
dividual’s labor supply.  
As described above, the labor supply decision consists of two parts. The first 
is the  labor force participation decision, or the  decision at the  extensive margin, 
which is the decision to supply labor at all. The second is the choice of the number of 
hours of work (conditional on the decision to work), also referred to as the decision 
at the intensive margin. A change in the parameters may induce individuals to move 
along the intensive margin (adjust the number of hours of work supplied) or to cross 
the extensive margin (stop or start working).  
As we estimate a model of the labor force participation decision, we limit our 
focus to the extensive margin only. We do so for the following reasons. First, in most 
occupations, people cannot choose the number of hours of work freely, but rather 
have them specified as part of their contract. People therefore mostly have control 
over the hours of work supplied only in the long run, when they choose the type of 
job. Second, different occupations are often characterized by different hours and wage 
combinations.
17 If individuals choose their hours of work and their pay jointly, when 
choosing their jobs, a consistent estimation of the labor supply of hours worked re-
quires that two separate equations for hours and wage are estimated simultaneously 
17 For example, consulting jobs typically pay a high per hour wage but require long working hours, while
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(such as in Moffitt, 1984). Third, previous research suggests that hours of work are 
typically over-reported and suffer from substantial measurement error.
18  
Fourth, the wage elasticity of labor supply seems to be much higher at the ex-
tensive rather than at the intensive margin (see Heckman, 1993), so that the largest 
impact of any changes in wages is expected to be on entry to or exit from the labor 
market. We therefore choose the labor force participation decision as our specifica-
tion of labor supply, as the one that is less affected by the listed estimation problems 
and also the one that is more relevant from a policy perspective. 
4. Econometric Model 
4.1 Labor Force Participation Decision 
Let LFPi denote an indicator that equals one if individual i decides to supply 
her labor on the market and zero otherwise. The theory suggests that LFPi depends 
on the effective net wage (the gross wage net of the explicit and implicit taxes im-
plied by the effective marginal tax rate of transition from not working to working), 
the individual’s non-labor income and other household income,
19 household charac-
teristics (Xi) and other factors that reﬂect individual preferences, and the  cost of 
working, among others:  
                                          ( ) (1 ) ii i i i LFP f w ,y ,X ,.... τ =−  
In order to estimate the  effect of the  wage on the  labor force participation 
decision, we approximate the optimal number of hours of work h
** by the following 
equation:  
                                        ( ) (1 )
**
ii i i i hl n w X ' α τβ ε = −++  
where (1−τi)wi is the effective net wage, Xi is a vector of all other variables that affect 
her decision to work, and εi is an error term assumed to be independent and normally 
distributed across individuals,  ( )
2 0 i N, . ε εσ ≈   
The probability that individual i supplies her labor is given by  
               ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr( 1) Pr 0 Pr ln (1 ) 0
**
ii i i i i LFP h w X ' ατ β ε = => = − + + >  
Given our assumptions about the error term εi, the labor force participation 
decision, as described by LFPi, can be estimated by a standard probit model:  
                     ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr 1 (1 ) ln (1 ) ii i i i i LFP | w ,X w X ' τ Φα τ β =− = − +  
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. As the model is 
non-linear, the impact of the right-hand side variables has to be expressed in terms of 
the marginal effects evaluated at different values of the independent variables.
20  
We follow the  standard approach in the  literature and define LFP = 1 for 
individuals who are working and for those who do not have a job but are seeking 
18 See Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers (1989) and Juster and Stafford (1991) for the evidence on 
misreporting. 
19 If utility is linear in c, the individual’s non-labor and other household income (y), which does not depend 
on working, cancels out. 
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employment, and LFP = 0 for those who neither work, nor wish to work (the so- 
-called inactive). This corresponds to the standard definition of the labor force as 
the sum of the employed and the unemployed.
21 
 The assumption is that, in contrast to 




Although standard, this assumption somewhat limits the  relevance of our 
findings for policy: it is both the supply and demand sides of the labor market that 
need to be in focus for employment-enhancing policies. There is no guarantee that 
any policy-induced increase in labor supply will be met by a corresponding increase 
in labor demand (that additional individuals interested in working will find a job).
23   
Even if we limit our focus to labor supply defined as desired employment, we 
have to bear in mind that labor force participation may be affected by the demand 
side conditions not only through the market wage, but also through the shortage of 
jobs. The discouraged workers desire to work, but (because of an unsuccessful job 
search) have stopped seeking employment, and therefore are not classified as sup-
plying their work. In our estimation, we proxy the  differences between the  con-
straints on the demand side by regional indicators and local unemployment.  
The key variable in the model is the individual’s wage; the main parameter of 
interest is α. As the  wage enters the  equation in logarithm, the  marginal effect 
corresponding to the coefficient α of the wage on the probability of supplying labor is 
the wage semi-elasticity of labor force participation. The wage elasticity can be cal-
culated by dividing the semi-elasticity by the probability of labor force participation 
or by the labor force participation rate.  
We estimate two specifications of this model. In the first, we use gross 
monthly earnings as the wage variable, and in the second, we replace them with the ef-
fective net monthly wage, which takes into account taxes and benefits. We interpret 
the  difference between the  results from the  two specifications as an  indicator of 
the welfare system disincentives.  
The construction of the wage variable is described in detail in the next section. 
Other right-hand side variables include other income, other economic activity in 
the household, and binary indicators of marital status, presence of children of dif-
ferent ages, education, and disability.  
Previous findings suggest that the  effects of the  wage as well as the  other 
right-hand side variables on the decision to work are often very distinct for women 
21 The standard ILO definition of unemployment requires two other conditions to be met besides the ex-
pressed desire to work: availability to start working and active job search. 
22 The labor supply decision of the unemployed is not straightforward. The job search literature tends to 
regard the unemployed and the inactive as one group of non-employed, with the inactive characterized by 
a very high reservation wage. Moreover, in particular in most of Europe, where unemployment benefits
and their duration are high and the eligibility criteria for receiving them are not as strict, it is often believed
that many of the unemployed (in particular the long-term unemployed) do not in effect supply their work
but instead only rely on government support. 
23 In a related paper (Bičáková, Slačálek, and Slavík, 2006), which evaluates the fiscal effects of personal 
income tax reforms in the Czech Republic in 2006, we estimate the probability of working, where the em-
ployed are contrasted with the non-employed, who include both the unemployed and the inactive. The rea-
son for this specification is that we are mostly interested in the probability of employment, i.e., in both 
the labor supply reaction to the changes in taxes as well as to what extent it is constrained by labor de-
mand. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4                                     335 
and men.
24 Following the literature surveyed above, we estimate the model separately 
by gender. 
4.2 Prediction of Gross Wages 
The econometric specification presented above uses information on wages, 
whether actual or potential, for all individuals. However, potential wages for those 
who do not work are not observed. We use the standard Heckman (1979) model to 
estimate the wage equation on the sample of workers, taking into account selection to 
employment. We specify a system of wage and selection equations, allowing for 
the  correlation between the  two error terms. The  system is estimated jointly by 
maximum likelihood as a  bivariate probit model.
25  Again, the  estimation is done 
separately by gender. The bias-corrected estimated wage equation is used to predict 
the gross hourly wage for everybody in our sample.  
We then transform the predicted gross hourly wage into full-time equiva- 
lent gross monthly wages,
26 assuming 40 hours of work per week and 4.3 weeks per 
month.
27 In the  estimation of the  labor force participation model, we use the  two 
specifications mentioned above: the first with the predicted full-time equivalent gross 
monthly wage, and the second with the effective net wage, which is the predicted 
full-time equivalent gross monthly wage net of any taxes and transfers. We describe 
the method for the construction of effective net wages in the next section.  
Our econometric model requires at least one exclusion restriction for identifi-
cation of the wage equation and one exclusion restriction for identification of labor 
force participation.
28 We use standard demographic characteristics such as marital 
status, children, household composition, and other income (excluding social trans-
fers) as the variables affecting the probability of working, but exclude them from 
the wage equation, as they are unlikely to have an impact on an individual’s current 
wage. Dummy variables for regions and the degree of urbanization of the residence
29 
are assumed to affect the wage levels but not the probability of supplying labor.
30  
24 In particular, the presence of children typically has a positive (but often insignificant) effect on the labor 
supply of men, while it has a highly significant and negative effect on the labor supply of women. See, for 
example, Bičáková et al. (2006). 
25 The specification of the two equations of the Heckman model is available from the authors upon request. 
26 The predicted gross monthly earnings that fell below the Czech statutory minimum wage in 2002 (36 in-
dividuals, or 0.5 percent of the predicted wages) were set to the level of the minimum wage of CZK 5,700. 
27 To construct the net monthly earnings of non-workers, we need to assume how many hours they would
work. We also need this information to be able to determine into which tax bracket they would fall. Given 
that part-time employment opportunities in the Czech Republic are still rather limited and most of the em-
ployed in the sample work full time (40 hours per week), we simply assume that if non-workers were to 
start working, they would work full time. (The share of individuals working part time, i.e., less than 35 hours
a week, among the individuals with valid weekly hours information is 6.72 percent for women and 1.45 per-
cent for men in our sample.) 
28 The exclusion restrictions require that at least one right-hand side variable is unique to each of the two 
equations, i.e., is present in one equation and not in the other. 
29 In addition, when we control for the wage in the labor force participation equation, we find that age is no 
longer significant. We therefore exclude age from the final model and use it as an additional exclusion re-
striction. 
30 Both sets of exclusion restrictions were tested by the simple procedure of including them one at a time in 
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Finally, the standard errors (of the coefficients and of the marginal effects) 
from the model of labor force participation are bootstrapped to account for the fact 
that we are using a predicted wage variable in the estimation. 
4.3 Construction of Effective Net Wages 
The effective net wage is then constructed from the gross wage as  
                                                (1 ) ii i ENW GW τ = −×  
where  GWi denotes the  predicted gross monthly wage of the  individual i.  τi is 
the individual-specific effective marginal tax rate of the transition from not-working 
to working, defined as
31 
 
                                       ( )
1





where  NW is the  predicted gross monthly wage net of any taxes or social con-
tributions such as mandatory health and social insurance, SBwork are social benefits if 
working, and SBnonwork are social benefits if not working. As the social benefits often 
depend on household composition and typically target entire households rather than 
individuals, we include the total social transfers at the household level in SBwork and 
SBnonwork. The structure of the benefit system implies that an individual’s decision to 
work will affect the  social transfers received by the  entire household. The  model 
implies that this reduction will be one of the factors considered in the individual’s 
labor supply decision.  
4.4 Tax and Benefit System 
This subsection brieﬂy describes the Czech system of personal income taxes 
and social benefits in effect in 2002, the year when the data were collected. The per-
sonal tax scheme was stepwise with four tax brackets. Tax rates for the four sub-
sequent income brackets were 15%, 20%, 25%, and 32%. The part of income that 
falls into the lower bracket(s) was taxed at the corresponding lower tax rate(s); only 
the part that exceeds the lower bracket(s) was taxed at the higher tax rate(s). Tax 
rates are applied to a tax base, defined as the sum of various income categories (e.g., 
wages, rental, and entrepreneurial incomes) minus allowances for non-taxable items 
and deductibles. The  main social benefits consisted of five components: parental 
allowance, child benefits, housing benefits, social supplements, and social assistance.  
The detailed scheme of taxes and social benefits that we use for the construc-
tion of the  effective marginal tax rate and effective net wages is summarized in 
Table 1.
32  
Taxes were computed using the  parameters of the  tax system displayed in 
the top panel of the table. Net labor income was calculated by subtracting taxes and 
employee contributions to health and social insurance from gross income. For each 
individual, we construct two alternative values of the  total household-level social 
 
31 Constructing the effective net wage may be problematic in highly de-motivating benefit systems, where 
the effective marginal tax rate may be greater than one for some individuals. There are 126 such cases in
our sample. We retain them in the estimation but topcode the value of τi for these observations at 0.99. 
32 Table 1 is adapted from table 1 of Galuščák and Pavel (2005). For details of the Czech tax and benefit 
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Table 1  Summary of the Czech System of Taxes and Social Benefits, 2002  
Item   Amount (%/CZK per Month) 
Social Security Contributions   % 
 12.5 
Tax Allowances   CZK per Month 
    Person   3170 
    Spouse*   1810 
    Dependent Child   1960 
Income Tax (CZK per Month)   % 
    0–9100   15 
    9101–18200   20 
    18201–27600   25 
    27601 and more   32 
Parental Allowance**  CZK per Month 
    Child below 4 Years   1.1×MLSi 
Child Benefits (CZK per Month)    
    I1 < 1.1 × MLStot   0.32×MLSch 
    1.1 × MLStot < I1 < 1.8 × MLStot   0.28×MLSch 
    1.8 × MLStot < I1 < 3 × MLStot   0.14×MLSch 
Housing Benefit (CZK per Month)    
    I2 < MLStot   MLShh − MLShh/1.6 
    MLStot < I2 < 1.6 × MLStot  MLShh − (MLShh × I2)/(1.6 × MLSf ) 
Social Supplement (CZK per Month)    
    I2 < MLStot   MLSch − MLSch/1.6 
    MLStot < I2 < 1.6 × MLStot   MLSch − (MLSch × I2)/(1.6 × MLSf ) 
Social Assistance (CZK per Month)    
    I3 < MLStot  MLStot − I3 
Minimum Living Standard (MLS)   CZK per Month 
    Adults (MLSi)   2320 
    Dependent Children (MLSch)    
        Below 6 Years   1690 
        6–10 Years   1890 
        10–15 Years   2230 
        15–26 Years   2450 
    Household (MLShh)    
        1 Member   1780 
        2 Members   2320 
        3 or 4 Members   2880 
        5 and More Members   3230 
Notes: Adapted from table 1 of Galuščák and Pavel (2005). The mean and median gross wage in our esti-
mation sample are 16001 CZK and 14697 CZK, respectively, for men and 12599 CZK and 11076, re-
spectively, for women. MLStot: total minimum living standard of the household – the sum of the in-
dividual parts of each member (MLSi/MLSch) and the household part (MLShh). *: spouse is inactive or 
earning less than the basic tax allowance per person; **: the allowance is provided if the individual 
earns less than MLSi. Benefits are not subject to taxes. I1: net earnings of both spouses + unem-
ployment benefits + parental allowance. I2 = I1 +child benefits. I3 = I2 +housing benefit + social sup-
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benefits conditional on whether she works. The middle panel shows how the five 
components of social benefits were calculated depending on the level of net income, 
the definition of which varies across the benefits, and on the various minimum living 
standards (which are defined in the bottom panel and determined by the composition 
of the household). 
5. Data 
The data come from the Czech Household Income Survey (Mikrocensus) for 
the year 2002 collected by the Czech Statistical Office. The survey was conducted be-
tween February 28 and March 25, 2003 and covers 19,003 individuals in 7,973 house-
holds.  
For our estimation, we select only the individuals who are 25–54 years old. 
Students, the self-employed, and fully disabled individuals are excluded. In all these 
cases, as well as for the very young and the very old, the labor supply decision is 
more complex than the theoretical and econometric models which are used here 
can capture. Given these restrictions, the estimation sample consists of 6,767 indi-
viduals – 3,094 men and 3,673 women – living in 3,518 households. As the esti-
mation is done separately for women and men, we split and describe our sample 
by gender.  
Table 2 summarizes the basic characteristics of the most relevant variables. 
The female and male labor force participation rates in our sample are 84 and 98 per-
cent, respectively. The proportion of the unemployed is comparable for the two gen-
ders: 4.3 percent for women and 4.4 percent for men.
33  
Other income, defined as the sum of the non-labor income of the individual 
and other household income (after tax and excluding social benefits), varies substan-
tially and is 543 Czech korunas (CZK) per month for households in which women 
live and CZK 482 for households in which men live, on average.
34  
The mean age is slightly less than 40 years for both genders. About half of 
the respondents (56 percent of women and 48 percent of men) have higher education, 
defined as having completed secondary education. Almost 70 percent of men and 
women in our sample are married. The children variables are binary indicators of 
the presence of children of a particular age in the household.
35 The distribution of 
the presence of children of different ages is fairly similar for women and men. A typ-
ical household has about three members. Other economic activity in the household is 
defined as the  presence of economically active members other than the  analyzed 
individual and her spouse.  
33 The aggregate unemployment rate for the whole population older than 25 years was 6.1 percent overall
(9.0 percent for women and 4.7 percent for men) in 2002. The rates for the two genders are much more 
similar in our sample than usually documented by aggregate statistics because of the exclusion of the self-
-employed, who are more likely to be men, which reduces the measured unemployment rate of men rela-
tive to women. 
34 The distribution of other income is highly skewed: 2,038 individuals (30%) have no other income and
75% have less than CZK 135 per month. 
35 Children can be linked to their parents only for household heads and their spouse. As we are using all
individuals in the household to increase our sample size, we are limited to the use of the information about 
the presence of children in the household. This may be adequate information, as child care may be pro-
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Table 2  Estimation Sample Summary Statistics  
 Men  Women 
Variable   Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Labor Force Participation   0.98  0.14  0.84  0.37 
Unemployed    0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 
Other  Income*  482 2,784 543 2,267 
Age    39.5 8.9 39.3 8.9 
Higher  Education    0.48 0.50 0.56 0.50 
Married    0.66 0.47 0.69 0.46 
Children < 2 Years   0.10  0.30  0.11  0.31 
Children 3–5 Years   0.11  0.31  0.11  0.32 
Children 6–9 Years   0.15  0.36  0.17  0.38 
Children 10–15 Years   0.25  0.43  0.30  0.46 
No. Hh Members   3.11  1.22  3.18  1.13 
Other Ec Act in Hh   0.31  0.63  0.40  0.64 
Partly Disabled   0.02  0.15  0.02  0.15 
Sample Size   3,094  3,673 
Notes: * Other income is the sum of the non-labor income of the individual and other household income (after 
tax and excluding social benefits) in 2002 CZK. Other economically active members in the household 
(“Other Ec Act in Hh”) are all the household members (excluding the head and, if present, the spouse) 
who currently work.  
 
Women are somewhat more likely to live in households with other econom-
ically active members (40 percent of households) than men (30 percent of house-
holds). About 2 percent of individuals of both genders are partly disabled.  
6. Results 
The results from the first stage of our estimation, the Heckman model of 
the system of wage and selection equations, used for the prediction of gross hourly 
wages, are in line with our prior expectations and with the evidence from the litera-
ture for standard market economies.
36 Wages increase with age and education. 
The  degree of urbanization of the  residence also leads to a  higher wage, as does 
living in Prague. On the  contrary, disability significantly reduces the  wage level. 
While the results for the wage equation are fairly similar by gender, the selection 
equation shows more substantial differences between men and women. In particular, 
the effect of the presence of children is negative and large for women, while it is not 
significant for men. The effect of being married is negative for women but positive 
for men. Otherwise, the probability of selection into employment increases for both 
genders with age and education, and decreases with other income, other economic 
activity in the household, and for the partly disabled.  
The marginal effects from the estimated probit model of labor force participa-
tion are presented in Tables 3 and  4. Although mean marginal effects would be 
preferable, the effects presented in these two tables are calculated at the means of 
the variables.
37 We use this convention here in order to simplify the calculation of 
 
36 The full sets of estimates from the Heckman model are available from the authors upon request. 
37 The marginal effects of binary right-hand-side variables are computed as a discrete change in the pre-
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Table 3  Marginal Effects – Men 
Gross Wage  Effective Net 
Variable  
Marg Eff  (Std Error)  Marg Eff  (Std Error) 
Log Wage    0.0219  (0.0207)     0.0085**  (0.0018) 
Other Income   −0.0088* (0.0039) −0.0076* (0.0032) 
Marriedd    0.0064  (0.0042)   0.0019  (0.0032) 
Higher Education
d    0.0042  (0.0079)  0.0028  (0.0028) 
Other Ec Act in Hh   −0.0040* (0.0018)    −0.0061** (0.0017) 
Children <2 Years
d    0.0036  (0.0039)     0.0063**  (0.0024) 
Children 3–5 Years
d   −0.0083  (0.0072)       −0.0036 (0.0059) 
Children 6–9 Years
d   −0.0019 (0.0047)   0.0007  (0.0035) 
Children 10–15 Years
d     0.0019  (0.0038)   0.0039  (0.0030) 
Partly Disabled
d     −0.1973† (0.1129)     −0.1698** (0.0500) 
N   3094 3094 
Log-likelihood   −222.122  −205.291 
χ
2
(10)   163.36  197.02 
Notes: Marginal effects evaluated at the means of variables. 
d: A discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 
to 1. {†,*,**} = statistical significance at {10, 5, 1} percent. Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 re-
plications.  
 
Table 4  Marginal Effects – Women  
Gross Wage  Effective Net Wage 
Variable  
Marg Eff  (Std Error)  Marg Eff  (Std Error) 
Log Wage       0.1616**  (0.0539)     0.0550**  (0.0063) 
Other Income     −0.0608** (0.0234)    −0.0418† (0.0216) 
Marriedd    −0.0284* (0.0111)      −0.0419** (0.0100) 
Higher Education
d  −0.0256 (0.0225)  −0.0150 (0.0109) 
Other Ec Act in Hh     −0.0930** (0.0074)      −0.1020** (0.0077) 
Children <2 Years
d     −0.5848** (0.0300)      −0.5461** (0.0322) 
Children 3–5 Years
d     −0.3672** (0.0274)      −0.3538** (0.0285) 
Children 6–9 Years
d     −0.0564** (0.0165)      −0.0418** (0.0146) 
Children 10–15 Years
d   −0.0274* (0.0128) −0.0139 (0.0120) 
Partly Disabled
d     −0.4981** (0.0712)      −0.4738** (0.0687) 
N   3673 3673 
Log-likelihood   −923.349  −864.713 
χ
2
(10)   1407.28  1524.56 
Notes: Marginal effects evaluated at the means of variables. 
d: A discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 
to 1. {†,*,**} = statistical significance at {10, 5, 1} percent. Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 re-
plications.  
 
the  bootstrapped standard errors. For a  subset of results, we later show the  mean 
marginal effects, i.e., the means of the marginal effects evaluated for each individual 
for comparison. The results do not seem to differ substantially with the method em-
ployed.  
The two tables show the results for men and women respectively and compare 
the  specification with the  gross wage and with the  effective net wage. Exploring 
the fit of the model based on two standard measures – pseudo-R
2 and χ
2 statistics of Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4                                     341 
the Wald test of all coefficients (except for the constant) being equal to zero – sug-
gests that for both the male and female sample, the specification with the effective 
net wage performs better than the one with the gross wage.  
The wage semi-elasticity of probability of supplying labor – the key parameter 
of interest – is given in the first rows of the two tables.
38 
  
The wage semi-elasticity of labor supply is substantially larger for women than 
for men (in both specifications). While the gross wage has no significant effect on 
the male labor force participation decision (even at the 10 percent level), its effect is 
highly significant for women and implies that a one percent increase in the gross 
monthly wage increases the probability of supplying labor by 0.16 percentage point 
for a woman with the average characteristics in the sample. The corresponding elas-
ticities,
39 calculated by dividing these numbers by the predicted probability of labor 
force participation at the means of the variables, are 0.0221 and 0.1766 for men and 
women, respectively.
40  
Focusing on the second specification, the semi-elasticities of labor force par-
ticipation to the effective net wage are about one-third as large as to the gross wage: 
a one percent rise in the effective net wage increases the probability of supplying 
labor by about 0.06 percentage point for women and by less than 0.01 percentage 
point for men, but both effects are significant at the  1 percent level. The  corre-
sponding wage elasticities are 0.0086 and 0.0595 for men and women, respectively.  
We conjecture that the gross wage elasticities are greater than the effective net 
wage elasticities mainly because the effective net wage is distributed among indi-
viduals more unevenly.
41 
 This result follows because the marginal effective tax rate 
that we use to construct the effective net wage takes into account both actual income 
taxes and social contributions and implicit taxation (the reduction in social transfers 
associated with wage increases).
42  
38 The wage semi-elasticity of labor force participation η is defined as 







    
and is therefore equal to the marginal effect of the wage on the probability of supplying labor, i.e., 












where φ(•) is the standard normal probability density function. The estimated effect can be interpreted as fol-
lows: a one percent rise in wage increases the probability of supplying labor by 0.01 × MFX (or the labor
force participation rate from LFP% to [LFP + MFX]%). 








 and can therefore be calculated as  






using the estimated value of η and the predicted value of Pr(LFP = 1) evaluated at the means of the vari-
ables. 
40 These elasticities are close to the wage semi-elasticities reported in Tables 3 and 4 because the predicted 
participation rates are close to 1 (99.1 and 91.5 percent for men and women, respectively). 
41 Intuitively, the estimated elasticities are proportional to the covariance of employment with the wage and 
are inversely related to the variance of the wage (think a linear version of our probability model). While 
the first term happens to be similar for both specifications, the higher variance of the effective net wage 
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Table 5  Marginal Effects by Wage and Gender – Gross Wages 
Wage  
Quintile  Men Wage (CZK)  MFX  Women Wage (CZK) MFX 
Q1  Below 12,430  0.0787  Below 8,949  0.1891** 
Q2  Below 13,204  0.0328  Below 9,732  0.1406** 
Q3  Below 15,772  0.0289  Below 12,531  0.1553** 
Q4  Below 17,142  0.0141  Below 13,534  0.1428** 
Q5  Above 17,142  0.0118  Above 13,534  0.1011** 
All   0.0313    0.1431** 
Notes: Averages of individual-specific marginal effects in each quintile. {†,*,**} = statistical significance  
at {10, 5, 1} percent.  
 
Table 6  Marginal Effects by Wage and Gender – Effective Net Wage 
Wage 
Quintile  Men Wage (CZK)  MFX  Women Wage 
(CZK)  MFX 
Q1  Below 12,430   0.0338**      Below 8,949  0.0638** 
Q2  Below 13,204   0.0137**      Below 9,732  0.0468** 
Q3  Below 15,772  0.0128*      Below 12,531  0.0539** 
Q4  Below 17,142   0.0062†      Below 13,534  0.0500** 
Q5  Above 17,142   0.0057†      Above 13,534  0.0375** 
All   0.0136*    0.0497** 
Notes: Averages of individual-specific marginal effects in each quintile. {†,*,**} = statistical significance  
at {10, 5, 1} percent.  
 
As we have so far evaluated the marginal effects at the means of the variables, 
they only represent the response of an individual with average characteristics. We 
next explore in Tables 5 and 6 how the estimated wage semi-elasticities vary across 
the different wage levels. The marginal effects in these two tables are computed as 
the within-quintile and overall averages of the marginal effects evaluated for each 
individual. Comparing the overall marginal effects in the bottom lines of these two 
tables with the marginal effects in Tables 3 and 4 suggests that our main results are 
reasonably invariant to whether the effects are evaluated at the means or whether 
mean marginal effects are computed.
43  
In agreement with previous literature, the results show that wage semi-elas-
ticity decreases with wage level. This is true for both specifications and both genders, 
the only exception being women in the second quintile, who tend to be somewhat 
less responsive to the wage than those in the third and fourth quintile. The values are, 
however, very close, and the differences across these quintiles are insignificant.  
The cross-quintile differences are substantially more pronounced for men than 
for women. The semi-elasticity of labor force participation of men with respect to 
the effective net wage is significant at 1 percent in the first quintile and is almost six 
42 The variance of the effective net wage ENW = NW + SBwork − SBnonwork is higher than that of the gross 
wage primarily due to the social benefits SBwork and especially SBnonwork, which vary substantially across 
people. The  distribution of simple after-tax wages, however, is (as in most countries) naturally more
compressed than that of gross wages, due to the redistributive character of the Czech tax system. 
43 The former, however, allow us to obtain the correct standard errors through simple bootstrapping meth-
ods, which is why we choose to present these in the first two tables. The significance in the other two 
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times greater than the wage semi-elasticity in the fifth quintile, which is more- 
over only weakly significant. A one percent increase in the effective net wage raises 
the labor force participation of men in the first quintile by 3.38 percentage points, al-
most three times more than the overall average marginal effect. The effect of the gross 
wage on the probability of supplying labor is insignificant for each quintile. The wage- 
-elasticity of women is distributed more equally across the quintiles, with the size in 
the first quintile being less than twice the size in the fifth quintile. While the gross 
wage semi-elasticity ranges from 0.19 in the first quintile to 0.10 in the fifth, the range 
for the effective net wage elasticity is between 0.06 and 0.04.  
We interpret the difference between the two estimated elasticities as an indi-
cator of the welfare system disincentives. This behavior-based measure suggests that 
in the presence of taxes and benefits, more substantial changes in the gross wage are 
required to induce the same increase in labor force participation compared to the case 
with no welfare system.  
Measured as the difference between the marginal effects for the gross and 
the effective net wage specifications, the welfare system disincentives are greater for 
women than for men and vary only little with wages. The marginal effect of the ef-
fective net wage on labor force participation is lower than the effect of the gross 
wage by 65 and 57 percent for women and men, respectively. The disincentives vary 
between 52 and 57 percent for men and between 63 and 67 percent for women across 
the five wage quintiles and tend to be a bit lower for the rich.  
Based on the comparison of the results from the two specifications, we con-
clude that the Czech welfare system in 2002 reduces the labor supply response of 
men and women to the market wage by 39 percent and 34 percent, respectively.  
The estimated effects of other determinants of labor force participation are 
also in line with the results documented in the standard literature, which suggests that 
labor supply behavior in the post-transition Czech Republic is comparable to that in 
mature market economies.  
Both other income and other economic activity in the household capture other 
sources of non-social income, alternative to the income from the individual’s labor 
supply. Their coefficients therefore measure the income effect on labor supply and 
are both negative and significant in line with economic theory.  
Once we control for the wage levels, education has no effect on labor force 
participation for both specifications and for both genders. This result is not sur-
prising, as wages are highly correlated with education.
44 Partial disability substantial-
ly decreases the probability of supplying labor, with the size of the effect for women 
(decreasing the participation probability by almost 0.5) being more than twice that 
for men.  
Children have no effect on whether men supply labor, but they substantially 
reduce the labor force participation probability of women. The size of the effect sharply 
declines with children’s age.
45 Similar to the effect of the presence of children, marital 
status has no effect on men, but reduces the labor force participation of women.  
44 The same holds for age and age squared, which we decided to leave out of the final model of labor force 
participation as an additional exclusion restriction. 
45 The fact that the presence of children below 2 years of age increases male labor force participation for
the effective net wage specification most likely captures the need for other sources of income when 
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Table 7  Pre-and Post-Transition Participation Rates (Percent)  
Men Women 
Country  
1988 2005 1988 2005 
Czech Republic   97.0  94.8  93.1  81.6 
Slovakia  96.9 93.2 88.8 82.5 
Russia  96.2 92.5 91.7 86.3 
EU 15
*  94.0 92.6 61.7 75.4 
United  States  93.6 90.7 72.7 76.7 
Notes: Participation rates (ratios of economically active to total population) for individuals between 25 and 
54 years of age.  
Sources: Economically Active Population Estimates and Projections, International Labour Organization, 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/. * OECD Labor Force Statistics from OECDStatsExtracts. 
 
The sign and significance of the marginal effects of variables other than the wage 
seem to be fairly similar across the two specifications for both women and men.  
Finally, in order to make our estimates directly comparable to the values esti-
mated in the two previous studies of the labor force participation of married women 
in Hungary and in the Czech and Slovak Republics (Saget, 1999, and Chase, 1995, 
respectively), we restrict our sample to married women and repeat our analysis. Al-
though the estimated wage elasticity slightly increases, in line with the documented 
evidence that the labor supply of married women is typically more wage sensitive 
than that of single women, the results do not substantially change. While the gross 
wage semi-elasticity increases from 0.1616 to 0.1758, the effective net wage semi-
elasticity changes from 0.0550 to 0.0566.
46  
7. International Context and Policy Implications 
In many Communist countries – including Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
and the Soviet Union – labor force participation was obligatory.
47 Although a gradual 
withdrawal from the  labor market occurred during the  transition from planned to 
market economies,
48 the labor force participation rates in many European post-Com-
munist countries, in particular among women, remain high when compared to the ma-
ture market economies of the EU15 or the US (see Table 7).
49  
The low estimates of the wage elasticity of the labor supply in the Czech Re-
public are consistent with the evidence documented for mature market economies 
that labor force participation and the wage sensitivity of labor supply are inversely 
related (see Blau and Kahn, 2007, and Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis, 2011). We 
therefore expect a weak response of labor supply to wages also in other post-transi-
46 The full estimation results for the subsample of married women are available from the authors upon re-
quest. 
47 Interestingly, this was not the case in other Communist countries, such as Poland and Hungary. How-
ever, the female labor force participation rates in these countries were still fairly high according to the ILO 
statistics (around 80 percent), compared to Western Europe. 
48 There are a few studies, such as Bonin and Euwals (2005), that try to disentangle whether this was due
to a change in supply (some people stopped working once the choice became available) or demand (ob-
solete human capital left many people jobless, some of whom left the labor force). 
49 Bonin and Euwals (2005) reports that the female participation rates in East Germany were over 80 per-
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tion countries, which have retained high labor force participation rates since the Com-
munist period.  
Our findings suggest that changes in taxes or benefits resulting in changes of 
the effective net wage will have the greatest impact on individuals at the bottom of 
the wage distribution and also on women (rather than on men).
50  
Policy measures aimed at enhancing labor supply should therefore primarily 
target these groups and focus on income taxes in the lowest tax brackets and on 




We provide one of the first estimates of labor supply using post-transition 
Czech data. We construct a measure of the effective net wage, which takes into ac-
count the tax and benefit system, and estimate the wage elasticity of labor force par-
ticipation in the Czech Republic using the gross and the effective net wage.  
While our analysis is subject to many limitations, a number of conclusions 
emerge clearly and robustly. We find that a one percent rise in the effective net wage 
increases the male labor force participation rate by 0.01 percentage point and the fe-
male labor force participation rate by 0.06 percentage point. The effective net wage 
semi-elasticity of the probability of labor supply decreases with wage, in particular 
for men. The wage elasticities of labor force participation of men and women in 
the bottom 20 percent of the wage distribution are 0.034 and 0.064 percentage points, 
respectively. Tax and benefit policies aimed at enhancing labor force participation 
should thus primarily target low wage individuals and also women rather than men.  
When we replace the  effective net wage with the  gross wage, the  corre-
sponding semi-elasticities are 0.16 for women and 0.02 (but insignificant) for men. 
We interpret the difference between the two estimated elasticities as a behavior-based 
measure that is an  indicator of the  welfare system disincentives and conclude that 
the Czech tax and benefit system in 2002 reduced the labor supply response of women 
to the market wage by 65 percent and that of men by 57 percent.  
While our qualitative results are in line with previous research, suggesting that 
labor supply behavior in the post-transition Czech Republic is comparable to that in 
mature market economies, the estimated effects are relatively small. This result is 
consistent with the recent empirical evidence that the labor supply in countries with 
high labor force participation rates, such as the Czech Republic, tends to be less sen-
sitive to wages. We therefore expect a limited response of the labor supply to wages 
also in other post-transition countries, which have retained high labor force partici-
pation rates since the Communist period. 
 
50 For example, Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis (2011) argue for gender-specific taxation: because
the labor supply of women is more responsive to wages, the optimal income tax rates (other things being 
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